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Developing states lack access to pandemic influenza vaccines.  The provision of ‘essential’ 
medicines is a core, non-derogable obligation of the right to health in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which states must fulfill as 
a minimum criterion. The ICESCR does not provide an exhaustive list of which drugs 
constitute “essential medicines,” although influenza vaccine was listed as an essential 
medicine during the most recent influenza pandemics. This paper presents three, 
interlocking arguments: First, it argues that ensuring access to a vaccine during an 
influenza pandemic is a right to health obligation for all states. Second, it argues that the 
access threshold a state must meet in order to discharge its right to health obligation in 
respect of access to pandemic influenza vaccine is different to the access threshold with 
oral solid drugs, and attempts to quantify the vaccine access threshold. Third, it examines 
the extent to which the World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Framework can enable developing states to meet the vaccine access 
threshold during an influenza pandemic, and discharge their right to health obligations in 
this area, arguing that the Framework is unlikely to have a significant positive impact on 
access to vaccines by developing states during the next influenza pandemic. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Vaccines are a key component in the response to an influenza pandemic; the timely 
administration of an influenza vaccine is the most effective public health intervention to halt 
the spread of infection and prevent mortality from influenza in adults,1 the elderly,2 and 
children.3 However, developing states have long complained that they are unable to access 
influenza vaccines during a pandemic, despite their best efforts,4 which may have 
implications for the ability of these states to meet their right to health obligations during an 
influenza pandemic.  
In an attempt to remedy poor access to pandemic influenza vaccines in developing 
states the World Health Organization (WHO) enacted the Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (PIP) Framework in 2011. The Framework creates a virtual stockpile of “at 
least 150 million doses” of pandemic influenza vaccine, which developing states can procure 
from during a pandemic. The WHO has traditionally played a major role in the management 
of pandemic influenza outbreaks since its inception,5 even going as far as to procure vaccines 
and distribute them to developing states that lack access during a pandemic, although this 
has been done on a largely ad-hoc basis.6  The PIP Framework aims to improve the 
procurement of pandemic influenza vaccines by developing states7  by creating a more 
structured approach to collection and distribution of donated pandemic influenza vaccines 
than the traditional ad-hoc manner in which the WHO has collected and donated vaccines. 
This is intended to ensure that the Pandemic influenza vaccines donated from 
manufacturers is not just given on an ad-hoc basis after orders from fee-paying states have 
been fulfilled, or once self-procuring states have determined they have excess pandemic 
influenza vaccines to meet their needs, as was the case with donations during 2009-H1N1.8  
Instead, donations of pandemic influenza vaccine may be included within the company 
obligations within Standard Material Transfer Agreements9 completed via the PIP 
Framework, which mandate that a proportion of the real-time pandemic influenza vaccines 
production are reserved for, and transferred to, the PIP stockpile. This is a ‘virtual’ stockpile 
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of pandemic influenza vaccines which have been donated by vaccine manufacturers that the 
WHO will manage.10  
The utility of the Framework at improving access to pandemic influenza vaccines 
during a pandemic has been explored in the literature, with no consensus being reached on 
how well, if at all, the PIP Framework can improve access in developing states. In order to 
advance these debates, this paper examines the utility of the Framework within the context 
of the right to health. It does this by examining how the PIP Framework improves the extent 
to which developing states can use the Framework to ensure that their populations have 
access to pandemic influenza vaccines. Prior to this analysis, it is necessary to demonstrate 
that ensuring access to pandemic influenza vaccines is an obligation binding upon states 
stemming from the right to health, and what a state ought to do in order to have discharged 
this obligation.  
 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
The right to health has been referenced in international agreements since the 1940s.11 The 
clearest articulation of the right to health has come in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by the United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly in 1966.12 The ICESCR built upon the ideas put forward in the WHO 
Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and, in placing obligations 
upon states, outlined what sort of action a state could take in order to ensure that the highest 
attainable standard of health could be enjoyed by its citizens. Within the context of 
pandemic influenza vaccine access, clearly 2(c) is most directly relevant: action necessary 
for “[t]he prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other 
diseases;” as noted above, pandemic influenza vaccines are the most effective method to 
prevent and control a pandemic outbreak within a population.  
The rights-based discourse is largely focused on the extent to which citizens of 
states can use the right to health in order to compel the state to act in a certain way to 
improve individuals’ health, such as providing for access to specific medicines. This rights-
based approach has been particularly successful in improving access to medicines in 
developing states, particularly HIV/AIDS medicines.13 Within the context of access to 
medicines, the state’s attempt to fulfill this positive obligation has typically manifested itself 
through legislative or policy changes intended to improve access, such as limiting the 
patentability of pharmaceutical products,14 the issuing of compulsory licenses,15 or using 
nationalized manufacturers to cheaply manufacture medicines.16  However, very little 
academic commentary has been generated regarding access to a vaccine as a component of 
the right to health.  
To this end, access to medicines, as a component of the right to health, was 
elaborated upon in the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ General 
Comment No. 14: the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health.17  General 
Comment 14 holds that states have a tripartite obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the 
right to health.18  Within the context of access to pandemic influenza vaccines, two of the 
“core obligations” of states are relevant: 
 
States must ensure provision of health care, including immunization programmes 
against the major infectious diseases.19 
The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness…includes the provision of equal and timely access 
to basic preventive, curative, rehabilitative health services and…the provision of 
essential drugs.20 
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It is clear that providing full access to vaccines during an influenza pandemic 
would enable a state to discharge its obligation fully in this regard. However, it remains 
unclear to what extent states can fail to provide full access to pandemic influenza vaccines 
(for whatever reason) and still be considered to have discharged their obligation.  Indeed, 
the right to health is progressive – generally, states party to the ICESCR undertake to  
 
[t]ake steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.21 
 
This Article of the Covenant is not particularly helpful when seeking to determine 
if, and when, a state party can be said to have discharged its right to health obligations. It is 
weakly worded and filled with uncertainty, particularly in relation to what “the maximum 
of its available resources,” “achieving progressively,” and “all appropriate means” relate to.22  
Given that a sufficient benchmark for a state having discharged its obligations in relation to 
access to vaccines is not provided in the ICESCR, it is necessary to turn to General Comment 
14 for further guidance. In the context of access to medicines, the provision of ‘essential’ 
medicines is a core, non-derogable obligation, which states must fulfill as a minimum 
criterion to meet their obligations under the Covenant.23  The ICESCR does not provide an 
exhaustive list of which drugs constitute “essential medicines,” instead relying upon the 
WHO Model List of Essential Drugs.24  While not listed on the current Essential Drugs list,25  
influenza vaccine was listed as an essential medicine on the 200926  and 2010 lists27, when 
2009-H1N1 was prevalent. It is likely that during a future influenza pandemic an influenza 
vaccine will again be listed on the WHO Model List of Essential Drugs, and therefore be 
considered an essential medicine for the purposes of the right to health.  
 
The Right to Health, and Access to Pandemic Influenza Vaccines 
 
During the most recent influenza pandemic (2009-H1N1), despite the clear 
obligation to provide pandemic influenza vaccines as an essential medicine, access to the 
vaccine was very poor in developing states. Most developing states either were not accessing 
the vaccine at all, or were accessing it significantly later than their developed neighbors.28  
If a rights-based approach to 2009-H1N1 were adopted, one could argue that developing 
states failed to meet their obligations regarding the right to health by failing to provide an 
“immunization programme against a major infectious disease”29  and failing to “provide 
essential drugs”30  for their population during 2009-H1N1.  However, such an approach may 
be too simplistic; developing states have long complained that they are unable to access 
influenza vaccines during a pandemic, despite their best efforts.31 This serves to highlight 
one of the significant drawbacks with the rights-based narrative regarding access to 
medicines in developing states: it presupposes that the state is capable of adequately 
addressing the problem with the resources that it has available to it. What of the state that 
lacks the means to secure access to medicines on behalf of its population? It would of course 
be unfair to claim that such states have failed to meet their positive obligations in regards 
to the right of health, when they lack the means to discharge the obligation.  
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This is neatly highlighted by contrasting Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which states that  
 
[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures32 [emphasis added] 
 
With paragraph 47 of General Comment no. 14, which states that 
 
[i]f resource constraints render it impossible for a State to comply fully with its 
Covenant obligations, it has the burden of justifying that every effort has 
nevertheless been made to use all available resources at its disposal in order to 
satisfy, as a matter of priority, the obligations outlined above. It should be stressed, 
however, that a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its 
non-compliance with the core obligations set out in paragraph 43 above, which are 
non-derogable.33 
 
Both the provision of essential drugs34  and the provision of immunization against 
major infectious diseases35 are core obligations within General Comment 14. Therefore, it is 
clear that not providing vaccines during an influenza pandemic constitutes a failure on the 
part of a state to meet its ICESCR obligations regarding the right to health, and resource 
constraints are not an adequate justification for failing to provide pandemic influenza 
vaccines. In short, states, including developing ones, must provide pandemic influenza 
vaccines to their population, or they will not have fulfilled their obligations under the 
ICESCR.  
 
DISCHARGING THE OBLIGATION 
 
In order to evaluate the extent that the PIP Framework can enable a developing state to 
discharge its right to health obligations in respect of access to pandemic influenza vaccines, 
it is necessary to make a determination regarding the threshold of vaccine access that needs 
to be met by a state in order for it to be considered to have discharged its obligation. On this 
point, General Comment no. 14 states that “[f]unctioning public health and health-care 
facilities, goods and services, as well as programmes, have to be available in sufficient 
quantity within the State party,”36  but no further guidance is provided as to what “sufficient 
quantity” means in this context. Within this paper, the notion of “sufficient access” is used, 
which is based on two interlocking factors: vaccination levels and vaccination timings. If a 
state achieves sufficient access to vaccines during an influenza pandemic, it is considered to 
have satisfied the requirements to have discharged its obligations regarding the right to 
health – full vaccination is not required to have discharged right to health obligations in this 
context.  
 
Vaccination Levels 
 
When discussing access to oral solid dose drugs, it is fairly straightforward to 
determine when a state has discharged its right to health obligations in respect of access to 
that drug – the right can be said to be discharged when all patients that require access to 
that drug have access. For example, the antiretroviral drug zidovudine, which is used to treat 
HIV infections, appears on the WHO Essential Medicines list,37  and therefore access to 
zidovudine constitutes a core obligation under General Comment no. 14, in much the same 
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way that access to pandemic influenza vaccines is likely to during a future pandemic. The 
right to health obligations in respect of zidovudine can be said to have been discharged when 
there is ready access to zidovudine for all patients who require it in order to treat their HIV 
infection. However, that is not the case when discussing vaccines – the beneficial effects of 
a vaccine are not just felt by the individual receiving the vaccine, but by those in the wider 
community too, due to community immunity.38 
Due to the mutations that occur with each strain of influenza virus, the vaccination 
coverage required in order to establish community immunity has fluctuated with each 
pandemic since 1900.39  Aside from 2009-H1N1, which was noted for having a having a 
particularly low mortality and infection rate40 when compared with more typical 
pandemics,41 a minimum vaccination coverage of at least 33% has been required in all 
pandemics in order to establish community immunity and slow down the rate of infection.42  
When discussing access to pandemic influenza vaccines as a right to health 
obligation, we are not just discussing access to pandemic influenza vaccines on an individual 
basis, but also the right to benefit from the herd immunity, which is established within a 
community when sufficient vaccine is administered. To that end, enough vaccine to 
immunize at least 33% of a state’s population will be taken to be ‘sufficient access’. This 
threshold is taken as it is sufficient to provide the beneficial effects of community immunity. 
Therefore, if sufficient vaccine has been procured in order for community immunity to be 
achieved within a population, it is possible to argue that the state’s right to health obligations 
have been discharged in respect of pandemic influenza to the entire community that is 
benefiting from the immunisation campaign, not just the individuals that have received the 
vaccine directly.  
 
Vaccinating Timings 
 
Pandemic influenza strains predominantly emerge in, and spread rapidly through, 
developing states.43  The states that are at a heightened risk from pandemic influenza are 
the most likely to be reliant upon donations from the WHO to gain access to pandemic 
influenza vaccines.44  These donations from the WHO arrive in much smaller batches than 
in developed states, and much later than in self-procuring developed states.45 This 
significantly hampers these states’ abilities to combat pandemic influenza outbreaks, meet 
community immunity thresholds, and limit or prevent the spread of the disease beyond its 
borders. Therefore, it is not just the amount of pandemic influenza vaccines that a state can 
access that is of relevance to this research, but also when access is gained.   
As the timing of vaccination administration is important for an effective domestic 
and international response to the pandemic, for the purpose of this research a state can be 
said to have discharged its right to health obligations in respect of pandemic influenza 
vaccines if its population has access to the vaccine within the same timeframe as developed 
states. 
 
USING THE FRAMEWORK TO DISCHARGE THE OBLIGATION  
 
The PIP Framework envisages that the WHO manage a stockpile of “around 150 million 
vaccines”; 50 million doses of the stockpile will be for use in “affected countries, according 
to public health risk and need, to assist in containing the first outbreak or outbreaks of an 
emerging pandemic” and “100 million for distribution…to developing countries that have 
no or inadequate access to…influenza vaccines, on a per capita basis that can be distributed 
to affected and at risk developing states during a pandemic.”46 
Since the creation of the Framework in 2011, the major developments in this area 
have been focused on the Standard Material Transfer Agreements (SMTAs) that the WHO 
has negotiated. The success of the Framework hinges upon the uptake of SMTAs by 
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pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers, and the terms and conditions to which they are 
willing to agree. In the most recent review of the pandemic influenza vaccines 
manufacturing capacity, Partridge & Kieny (on behalf of the WHO) identified twenty-four 
manufacturers that are active in manufacturing pandemic influenza vaccines.47 In addition 
to this categorization of influenza manufacturers, the WHO, when calculating partnership 
contributions for the running costs of the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response 
System (GISRS), identifies those influenza vaccine manufacturers using the WHO GISRS, 
in order for them to contribute to the running costs.48  Of those manufacturers identified by 
Partridge & Kieny, eighteen also make partnership contributions to the WHO, on the basis 
that they use the WHO-GISRS.49 Use of GISRS is understood to include receipt of physical 
materials, or use of data and/or information, some of which may not be routinely provided 
to the general public.50 Uptake of SMTAs by pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers was 
initially slow, and despite the fact that eighteen active pandemic influenza vaccines 
manufacturers benefited from the work of GISRS, from 2011-late 2016 only three of these 
manufacturers had an SMTA2 in place, with only 46 million doses being committed to the 
Stockpile.  
However, more recently, there has been a proliferation of Agreements being signed 
with pandemic influenza vaccine manufactures, and to date the WHO has signed SMTAs 
with eleven pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers. All of these manufactures have 
committed to donating 7.5%-9% of their ‘real-time’ pandemic influenza manufacturing 
output to the WHO to supply the stockpile.51  The exact number of doses within the PIP 
Stockpile are not known, but the WHO has stated that it is “approximately three times the 
amount of pandemic vaccine available [to the WHO for distribution] during the H1N1 
pandemic.” Given that the stockpile the WHO managed during 2009-H1N1 distributed 78 
million doses,52 it is reasonable to assume that the stockpile currently holds around 230 
million doses. Such a drastic increase in the capacity of the Stockpile is clearly welcome, but 
it is necessary to determine to what extent this increase in commitments to the PIP Stockpile 
is likely to improve the extent to which developing states can use Framework to discharge 
their right to health obligations in respect of access to pandemic influenza vaccines.  
In respect of the “vaccination timing” element of the criterion against which we are 
judging the utility of the PIP Framework, it is it is clear that the one major benefit of the PIP 
stockpile is the removal of the time delay of donated vaccine being committed to the WHO, 
which has been a barrier to discharging the obligation during previous influenza 
pandemics.53 However, this benefit may not actually be realized in practice during the next 
pandemic. During 2009-H1N1, governments of developed states with domestic 
manufacturing capacity restricted exports to other territories, and to the WHO, until 
domestic demand had been fulfilled,54 and concern has been expressed by pandemic 
influenza vaccine manufactures that member states with domestic pandemic influenza 
vaccines production within their territory will place restrictions upon exports of vaccines 
that have been committed to the PIP stockpile, until domestic demand had been fulfilled.55 
Indeed, the Framework makes provision for such an event occurring, holding “no Party shall 
be liable for any delay in the performance of or failure to perform its obligations under this 
Agreement, where such a delay or failure is caused by Force Majeure,”56 including “embargo 
or requisition” and “acts of government.”57 Member States with domestic pandemic 
influenza vaccine manufacturing capacity have given assurances to the WHO that they 
would enable domestic manufacturers to fulfill their SMTA2 commitments without 
government interference;58 however, despite this, government requisition is a very real 
possibility, particularly during a severe pandemic. Such a requisition causing a delay to the 
real-time commitments to the Stockpile, and onward transfer to developing states would 
severely impact on the ability of a developing state to use the PIP stockpile in order to 
discharge its right to health obligation in respect of pandemic influenza vaccines. 
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The utility of the Stockpile to enable developing states to discharge their right to 
health obligation in respect of pandemic influenza vaccines appears less viable when 
vaccination levels are taken into consideration. The idea that the PIP Stockpile would be 
insufficient to rectify inequities in access to vaccines during a pandemic was addressed 
before the Stockpile went live, with scholars noting that even if the PIP Stockpile secured 
the 100 million doses to distribute to “developing states in need” as initially anticipated, this 
would provide for a vaccination level of approximately 1.8% of the population of developing 
states, even if a single dose regime was viable.59 However, since this time, the capacity of the 
Stockpile has grown considerably, beyond that which was initially envisaged by the WHO. 
The current PIP stockpile has approximately 230 million doses committed to it. However, 
not all of this stockpile is reserved specifically for developing states that are unable to 
procure Pandemic influenza vaccines on the open market.  
If the WHO maintains the proportions at which it intended to distribute the 
donated vaccine with  
 
One-third ‘for use in affected countries, according to public health risk and need, 
to assist in containing the first outbreak or outbreaks of an emerging pandemic’, 
two-thirds to ‘developing countries that have no or inadequate access to H5N1 
influenza vaccines, on a per capita basis, with use to be determined by those 
countries.60 
 
Assuming that two-thirds of this Stockpile is reserved for “developing states in need,” the 
stockpile could ensure a vaccination level coverage of 4.14% in developing states on a one-
dose strategy, and 2.07% on a two-dose strategy, which is much more typical of an 
immunization campaign against pandemic influenza. Both of these vaccination coverage 
levels are significantly below the target of 33% needed to establish herd immunity within a 
population. While the PIP Stockpile was not explicitly created with the 33% vaccination 
target in mind (nowhere in the drafting or the final text was a vaccination coverage target 
set), the herd immunity level of 33% is well established within the literature as the most 
desirable vaccination coverage target. In relation to this target, clearly, the commitments 
provided in the example SMTA2 do not make procurement from the PIP stockpile a 
particularly attractive procurement option for developing states, particularly if a developing 
state is seeking to procure sufficient vaccine in order to establish herd immunity levels 
within their territory in order to discharge their right to health obligations. 
The low uptake of SMTAs amongst pandemic influenza vaccines manufacturers, 
combined with the reduced commitments being given by pandemic influenza vaccines 
manufacturers in those SMTAs that have been concluded, make the PIP stockpile an 
undesirable procurement method for developing states. Moreover, even when all of the 
vaccine that has been committed to the WHO via SMTAs has been delivered, it is likely that 
the WHO will need to seek donations from pandemic influenza vaccines manufacturers 
(outside of SMTA2 commitments) and developed states in order to be able to meet the 
procurement needs of developing states, in much the same way they did during 2009-H1N1. 
This is a particularly undesirable scenario because, when making appeals for donated 
vaccine, the WHO will again have “little leverage to influence developed countries [and 
Pandemic influenza vaccines manufacturers] other than rhetoric about equity, justice, and 
solidarity.”61 If the WHO must again make appeals to equity and justice in order to procure 
vaccine to donate to developing states, as appears likely, it will highlight the significant 
shortcomings in the PIP Framework, which was designed specifically to minimize such a 
scenario during a pandemic.   
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RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Moving forward it would be beneficial if the WHO placed greater emphasis on transfer of 
technology in the SMTA negotiations. The PIP Framework envisages that manufacturers 
concluding an SMTA with the WHO may have agreed to transfer technical knowhow 
regarding the manufacturing of pandemic influenza vaccines to the WHO, for onward 
transfer to developing states. However, none of the eleven manufactures that have SMTAs 
with the WHO has agreed to transfer technology as part of their Agreements. The onward 
transfer of technology from established pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers to 
developing states could allow these developing states to establish pandemic influenza 
vaccine manufacturing capacity, which they could procure from when needed. If developing 
states were able to manufacture sufficient levels of pandemic influenza vaccines in order to 
achieve herd immunity, they could discharge their right to health obligations without being 
reliant upon procurement from established pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers in 
developed states or receiving donations from the WHO, both of which are unviable 
procurement options for developing states. The importance of transfer of technology to the 
success of this model has been noted by the World Health Assembly and the Developing 
Countries’ Vaccine Manufacturing Network.62 
Indeed, transfer of technology from an established vaccine manufacturer to Brazil 
has led to the state pharmaceutical manufacturer in Brazil, the Butantan Institute, to 
establish manufacturing capacity in the field of pandemic influenza vaccines. In 2011, the 
Butantan Institute delivered the first batch of vaccines against influenza entirely produced 
in Brazil. Currently, the Butantan Institute is able to manufacture both seasonal and 
pandemic influenza vaccines63and has manufacturing capacity for approximately 20 million 
doses.64 While it is important to note that this is not sufficient manufacturing capacity to 
meet the target to immunize 33% of the Brazilian population,65 and thereby discharge the 
right to health obligations, it is sufficient for approximately 10% coverage. This figure is 
significantly higher than the 4.4% vaccination coverage that is the best case scenario that 
could be achieved by developing states procuring from the PIP Framework. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This paper has argued that that direct procurement from the PIP Stockpile is not a viable 
option for developing states seeking to obtain sufficient access to pandemic influenza 
vaccines in order to discharge their right to health obligations. In the context of the right to 
health, the PIP Framework does provide one distinct benefit: if developing states were to 
procure vaccines from the PIP Stockpile, then these vaccine would be distributed within the 
same timeframe as developed states.66 While this is a clear benefit over procurement during 
2009-H1N1, procurement from the PIP Stockpile merely satisfies one element of the two-
part test outlined earlier in this paper. The second element of the two-part test, procuring 
sufficient levels of vaccine to immunize at least 33% of their population, cannot be satisfied 
by procurement via the PIP Framework. Therefore, a developing state cannot fulfill and 
discharge its right to health obligations in respect of pandemic influenza vaccines by relying 
upon procurement from the PIP Framework. With this is mind, it is reasonable to argue that 
the PIP Framework is not able to ensure that developing states are able make use of the 
Stockpile in order to discharge their core right to health obligations in respect of pandemic 
influenza vaccines, as mandated by General Comment 14.  
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